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SHERMAN ACT "JURISDICTION" IN HOSPITAL STAFF
EXCLUSION CASES*
INTRODUCTION

In the past several decades, access to hospitals has become an increasingly essential factor in the success of a physician's practice.' High
technology equipment has become a common requirement for sophistocated medical practice. Typically, only large institutions can bear the
high cost of such equipment. At the same time, the potentially tremendous liability hospitals face for malpractice2 has unquestionably made
them more circumspect not only in their hiring practices, but also in
their policies regarding the grant of staff privileges.' In this controversial setting, a recent doctrinal shift by Congress 4 and the courts 5 toward
* After this Comment went to press, the Third Circuit reversed the principal case
along lines similar to those suggested in this Comment. Cardio-Medical Assocs. v.
Crozer-Chester Medical Center, No. 82-1817 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1983), rev'g 552 F.
Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
1 For a historical overview of the "forces [which] have contributed to the development of a symbiotic relationship between the hospital and the physician, and to the rise
of the hospital as the monolithic structure with which all health care providers must be
affiliated in order to achieve legitimacy," see Note, Health Professionals'Access to Hospitals: A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1161-66
(1981). See also Cray, Due Process Considerationsin HospitalStaff Privilege Cases, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 261 (1979); Drexel, The Antitrust Implications of the
Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 207, 207 (1982).
2 Hospitals traditionally enjoyed a "charitable immunity" from tort liability. The
immunity was seen as necessary to shelter charitable institutions performing vital social
and economic services which otherwise would be the responsibility of the federal or
state government. More than half of the states have abolished charitable immunity
since 1942. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 996 (4th ed. 1971).
3 Forces that have contributed to limiting physicians' access to hospital privileges
include intraprofessional restraints imposed by state and local medical societies, state
licensing procedures, and internal hospital procedures for granting or denying hospital
privileges. See Note, supra note 1, at 1170-78; see also Palmer, Restrictions on Competition by Government and Association Regulation in ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH
CARE FIELD 63-64 (1979) (physician's malpractice history is a legitimate basis on
which hospital may exclude her).
" In the 1979 amendments to the Health Planning and Resources Development
Act, Congress specifically added that in appropriate areas of health plans, agencies
should "give priority. . . to actions which would strengthen the effect of competition."
42 U.S.C. § 300(k-2)(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979). In addition, a new goal was added to the
Act, that of "preserving and improving. . . competition in the health service area." Id.
§ 300(l-2)(a)(5). Finally, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee noted
that "special consideration [is to] be given throughout the planning process to the importance of maintaining and improving competition in the health industry." S. REP,.
No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1307, 1308.
5 For a description of the various health industry practices recently made vulnera(121)
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competition in all phases of the health care industry has helped spawn
a "burgeoning number of cases"' brought by private physicians under
the antitrust laws challenging their exclusion from hospital staff privileges. 7 Those suits are generally brought under section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act' and allege that hospitals, or doctors comprising the
hospital medical staff or board of directors, have combined and conspired to boycott competing medical practitioners, monopolize local
markets or foreclose competition in specialized medical services, and
control access to facilities essential to a medical practice. The hospitals,
in turn, defend the denial of staff privileges as a legitimate form of selfregulation.

Interesting ideological conflicts have arisen in the hospital staff exclusion cases. In particular, when an excluded physician is affiliated,
with a competing institution such as a low-cost abortion clinic,9 or is a
representative of an innovative or different professional group such as
osteopaths, 10 podiatrists, 1 chiropractors, 2 or the new health profesble to antitrust scrutiny, see Heitler, Antitrust, Restraint of Trade, and Unfair Business Practices: Impact on Physicians, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 443 (1982).
6 Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065,
1069, after amended complaint, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
7 See, e.g., Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715
(10th Cir.
1981) (en banc); Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys., 694 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1981);
Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,498 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or,
if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
s See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530
(5th Cir. 1978) (abortion center brought suit charging area physicians with conspiracy
to monopolize and restrain trade in provision of abortions and related services), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
10 See, e.g., Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d
791 (1961); cf Don v. Okmulgee Memorial Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971)
(osteopathic physician brought due process/equal protection suit against a public hospital for denying his staff membership application).

11 See generally Hollowell, The Growing Legal Contest-Hospital Privilegesfor
Podiatrists,23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 491 (1979) (an overview of regulations on the practice of podiatry, followed by analysis of cases in which podiatrists have challenged hospitals' exclusionary policies).
12 Several suits by chiropractors have alleged that radiologists have conspired to
boycott them by refusing consultations. See, e.g., In re Consumers Union of United
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sionals, 3 exclusion may represent an attempt by entrenched medical
interests to ward off competitive pressures from lower cost alternatives.14 Conflicts over the application of substantive antitrust doctrines
have arisen in these cases"5 and the prospects of success for plaintiffs
has been markedly improved by the erosion of a number of defenses for
hospitals." Ironically, at the same time that the judicial and legislative
climate has begun to favor application of the federal antitrust laws in
these cases, a number of federal courts have begun to apply overly rigorous interstate commerce standards to dismiss these suits summarily
17
on what they call "jurisdictional" grounds.
Each hospital staff exclusion case presents a threshold question
whether the challenged activities fall within the scope of the Sherman
Act.1 " A plaintiff must show that interstate commerce is implicated in
some way. The requirement stems from the language of section one of
the Sherman Act which prohibits only "restraints of trade or commerce
among the several states," 1 9 and reflects Congress's recognition of the
limits of its power.2 0 In light of the interstate commerce requirement,
courts have understandably been skeptical of antitrust claims involving
a single physician who has been denied staff privileges at a local hospiStates, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); New Jersey Chiropractic Soc'y v.
Radiological Soc'y, 156 N.J. Super. 365, 383 A.2d 1182 (1978); see also Ballard v.
Blue Cross of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976) (chiropractors brought
antitrust action against physicians, medical association, and corporations for allegedly
combining to refuse health insurance coverage for chiropractic services), cert. denied
430 U.S. 922 (1977).
13 The new health professionals are an example of lower cost alternative medical
practictioners. They are generally trained as nurses with some further education and
become nurse practitioners or physician's assistants. Nurse-midwives, nurses who can
deliver babies at birthing centers or at home at a substantially lower cost than that of
hospital delivery, are an example of the new health professionals. See Note, supra note
1, at 1195-98.
14 See generally Note, supra note 1, at 1185-98. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recently agreed to hear a case involving a physician excluded from
staff privileges at a hospital due to the hospital's exclusive dealing arrangements with
another professional medical corporation. The question is whether the exclusive dealing
arrangement constitutes a per se illegal tying arrangement or whether it should be
analyzed under the rule of reason. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 1271 (1983) (No. 82-1031).
1 For a discussion of the substantive antitrust issues implicated in the hospital
staff exclusion cases, see Havighurst, ProfessionalRestraints on Innovation in Health
Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J. 303, 309-10; Note, Application of the Antitrust
Laws to Anticoinpetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 991, 1021
(1977). See generally Drexel, supra note 1.
16 See infra note 28.
17 See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
11See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
20 See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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tal. At first glance it might seem incredible-and to some courts it remains so-that such claims could constitute restraints of "trade among
the several states." 2 But examined in light of the Supreme Court's expansive and expanding interpretations of what is "in"or "affects" interstate commerce,22 the issues do not seem subject to summary
resolution.
This Comment focuses on the application of the interstate commerce requirement to the recent influx of cases challenging hospital
staff exclusions. The Comment argues that in light of Supreme Court
precedent and congressional policy, lower courts have frequently applied overly restrictive standards in those cases. The Comment begins
with a brief summary of the scope and purpose of section one of the
Sherman Act, under which hospital staff exclusion cases are most frequently brought. It then demonstrates the confusion, both linguistic and
substantive, in many of the court decisions in this area. The general
development of the interstate commerce requirement under the Sherman Act will then be analyzed with an emphasis on the expansive
trend illustrated by a recent Supreme Court decision. Once the liberal
interpretations of the interstate commerce requirement have been established, the Comment focuses on the intransigence of some lower courts
which refuse to give effect to those trends and continue to dismiss hospital staff exclusion cases on what they call "jurisdictional" grounds.
The Comment then focuses on a recent district court decision, CardioMedical Associates, Inc. v. Crozer-ChesterMedical Center,2 3 one of the
very few examples of summary dismissal in which the court sets out its
analysis in detail. Finally, the Comment suggests an alternative standard which more fully effectuates the policies and purposes of the antitrust laws in the health care field.
The Comment does not address the underlying merits of the antitrust claims in hospital staff exclusion cases; each case turns on its own
facts. The Comment shows, however, that those claims must not be
dismissed in a summaiy manner according to anachronistic views as to
the antitrust status of a hospital or the scope of the Sherman Act.
21

Even one of the most vocal advocates of competition in the health care field, in

a statement before a Senate subcommittee, expressed doubt that in an isolated case of
one doctor suing a single local hospital, Sherman Act jurisdiction would be established.
Competition in the Health Services Market: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 1046-47
(1974) (statement of Clark C. Havighurst, Professor of Law, Duke University).
22 See infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
23 536 F. Supp. 1065, after amended complaint, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
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I.

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: THRESHOLD CONFUSION

Section one of the Sherman Act24 is the antitrust prohibition most
frequently invoked in the hospital exclusion cases.2 5 The scope of the
federal antitrust laws, including section one, is limited by Congress's
general legislative power. Section one's language limiting its prohibition
on restraints of trade to those occurring "among the several States, or
with foreign nations" reflects the limitation on federal legislative power
and at the same time prescribes the scope of the Sherman Act.2" The
interpretations of the jurisdictional phrase "trade and- commerce among
7
2
the several States" is analyzed below.

The erosion of certain historic exemptions from the Sherman Act
for defendants in the health care industry2" has caused such defendants
24 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,

in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
21 See Heitler, supra note 5, at 444.
28 See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
28 Traditionally, hospitals and doctors have asserted an array of well-established
defenses to claim immunity from liability under the federal antitrust laws. For example, until recently hospital or medical institution defendants argued that because the
Sherman Act speaks of trade or commerce, which might not include professional services, Congress never intended them to be subject to the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court has largely rejected that argument. It has not deferred to contentions that unbridled price competition might undermine the quality of professional services or lead to
deceptive advertising and pricing practices, and has accorded little weight to industry
"self-regulation"-which itself has frequently triggered scrutiny under the antitrust
laws. See, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232 (1980);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n,
549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); Elizabeth Hosp., Inc.
v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959); Rigall v. Washington County Medical
Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957); see also Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J. 443, 486 (relationship between regulators and regulated provides ample opportunities for abusive, anticompetitive practices).
Another antitrust exemption frequently argued by health care industry antitrust
defendants is that established in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943), in which
the Supreme Court concluded that the Sherman Act is inapplicable to conduct that
"derive[s] its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and
was not intended to operate or become effective without that command."
The state action exemption has often been an effective defense for health care
providers in antitrust actions since many hospital programs and practices are regulated,
authorized, or overseen by the state. In addition, large capital expenditures by hospitals
must be approved by state certificate-of-need programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1976
& Supp. III 1979) (denying Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements when capital expenditures not approved).
Since Parker, however, the Court has drastically limited the circumstances in
which the state action immunity may be invoked. First, "[s]tate authorization, approval,
encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct" gives rise to no immunity, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1976) (footnote omitted); the
activity must in some way have been "compelled by direction of the State acting as a
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to seek refuge in strict interpretations of the interstate commerce requirement. In view of the liberal development of the interstate commerce requirements in other contexts, however, continued reliance by
defendants and lower federal courts on subject matter jurisdiction as a
basis for summary dismissal of hospital staff exclusion cases is
misplaced.
A.

"Jurisdiction"

There has been a great deal of confusion in Sherman Act cases in
the courts' use of the term 'jurisdiction." That linguistic difficulty has
led to confusion in analysis. Often when the courts have discussed "jurisdiction" they have actually been discussing the "scope" of the Sherman Act.
When a court is presented with a dispute allegedly arising under
the Sherman Act, it must initially decide if it has power to hear the
dispute. Federal court jurisdiction2" is limited by the provisions of article III of the Constitution. 0 The federal court can hear the dispute
sovereign," Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. The Court has further limited the scope of the
immunity recently by holding that a mere legislative delegation of power to local political subdivisions does not constitute an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive activities, in the absence of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982). Under
those standards a defendant's invocation of the state action immunity is unlikely to meet
with success in any suit in which the defendant is a nonpublic entity, like a private
hospital or medical center. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d
280, 284 (4th Cir. 1977) (defendants must show "either that the state coercively commanded the private conduct, or that the state in the strictest sense of the term 'regulated' the private conduct"), vacated and remanded for reconsideration on other
grounds, 435 U.S. 992 (1978).
Finally, another antitrust exemption was thought to stem from the federal government's extensive regulation of the health care industry. For example, in the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300k-3001
(1976 & Supp. III 1979), Congress established a broad statutory scheme to prevent
maldistribution of health facilities and set up federal, state, and local bodies to coordinate activities in the area of health planning and policy. The comprehensive scope of
the Act understandably provoked claims of "implied exemption" from the antitrust
laws of activities undertaken by regional planning bodies pursuant to the Act. In a
unanimous decision, however, the Supreme Court decisively rejected the claimed exemption explaining that "[e]ven when an industry is regulated substantially, this does
not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the antitrust laws with respect to every
action taken within the industry." National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center
v. Blue Cross of Kansis City, 452 U.S. 378, 389 (1981). A defendant in a health care
case will have a difficult time, under such precedent, persuading a court that it fits into
an implied exemption.

See D. CURRIE,

29

FEDERAL COURTS

8-19 (3d ed. 1982).

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of

30
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only if it is a case or controversy and there is diversity of citizenship or
the case is one "arising under" the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 1
Undoubtedly, hospital staff exclusion antitrust cases are "cases or
controversies" and "arise" under a law of the United States and so fall
within the constitutional power of the federal judiciary. Consistent with
this analysis, Congress has passed a statute that explicitly grants federal district courts original jurisdiction of "any civil action or proceeding arising under" the antitrust laws.32 The hospital staff exclusion
cases clearly arise under the antitrust laws-the plaintiffs allege they
were injured by violations of those laws and base their suits on the
express right of action Congress gave them." Thus there is no question
that a federal court has power to hear those cases: the court has
jurisdiction.
The courts' preoccupation with "jurisdiction"3 4 involves other issues centering on the resolution of four independent questions: (1) Does
Congress have the constitutional power to bring the commercial activity
involved in the dispute within the scope of the Sherman Act? (2) Did
Congress in fact do so? (3) Does the allegedly illegal conduct in fact
violate the Sherman Act? and (4) Can the last question be answered
before trial?
None of those questions is jurisdictional, at least not in the sense
of whether the court has power to hear the case. For example, a court
could decide that, in answer to the first question, Congress had no
power to regulate commercial activity under the Sherman Act-that the
Act is unconstitutional. As discussed above,3 5 the court clearly has jurisdiction to make that determination.
admiralty, and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S.

CONST.

'art. III, § 2.

Id. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is further limited by 28 U.S.C. §§
1330-1364 (1976). Those further limitations are not relevant here, and for ease of exposition this comment will discuss only the constitutional limitations.
s "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies .. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976).
SS "[A]ny person who shall be injured. . . by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States. . .and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained .... " 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
31

3 See infra cases cited in note 78.
31

See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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The courts use the term "jurisdiction" in another sense-one
which should not necessarily be termed wrong (since a great many
courts seem to do it) but which may fairly be characterized as misleading. Typical is the Supreme Court's use of the term in McLain v. Real
Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.," in which the court repeatedly
referred to notions of "Sherman Act jurisdiction,"8 7 "the jurisdictional
requirement of the Sherman Act,"" 8 and "the jurisdictional element of
a Sherman Act violation."3 " The term "jurisdiction" seems to be used
in relation to the issue whether the Sherman Act "covers" the commercial activity involved. Another way of phrasing that issue is to ask
whether the parties' activity lies within "the scope" of the Sherman
Act. An activity lies within the scope of the Act if Congress intended
the proscriptions of the Act to apply to that activity. If an activity is
within the scope of the Act, a court should apply antitrust analysis to
determine if the defendant's specific conduct violates the Sherman Act.
When the courts have discussed "jurisdiction," they have, in fact,
been talking about the scope of the Sherman Act.
That is not a trivial distinction. Some courts, incorrectly believing
they have no jurisdiction, have dismissed antitrust cases under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
For example, the Fifth Circuit in McLain affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the suit, but said that dismissal should be under Rule
12(b)(1), not 12(b)(6) as the lower court had held.40 After noting that
the defendants "assert[ed] that the challenged brokerage activities were
wholly intrastate in nature and thus fell beyond the reach of federal
antitrust prohibitions,'

41

the Fifth Circuit went on to say, "[o]ur start-

ing point is the recognition that jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
extends to the furthest reaches of congressional power to regulate commerce." 42 That, of course, is wrong. The court's power has nothing to
do with Congress's.4 3 Acting on that misperception, the Fifth Circuit
said, "we hold that the proper disposition of this action requires a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction" under 12(b)(1).44
The court cited Mortensen v. First FederalSavings & Loan Asso38 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
37

38

Id. at 234, 245.
Id. at 242.

39 Id.
40
41
42

43

44

583 F.2d 1315, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
Id. at 1318.
Id.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
583 F.2d at 1324.
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ciation45 for the differences between dismissing an antitrust claim
under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6):
The differences . . are vital . . . especially when the claim
subject to dismissal arises under the Sherman Act. . . . Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's
jurisdiction-its very power to hear the case-there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to
hear the case . . . . [N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches
to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for
itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.. Moreover, the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in
fact exist.4
Thus the misuse of the term "jurisdiction" may be quite significant. The use of the wrong word results in imposing an extra burden of
proof upon antitrust plaintiffs and defeats the purposefully liberal rules
47
of pleading complaints in federal court.
B.

Scope of the Act v. Violation of the Act

Confusion exists even aside from the issue of "jurisdiction." Courts
have, in many instances, mixed together two different analyses designed
for two different purposes.
Courts must recognize the distinction between that which is within
the scope of the Act and that which violates the Act. An activity may be
within the scope of the Act and yet not violate the Act. Similarly it may
be said that an activity would violate the Act if it were within the Act's
scope. For instance, it is well known that the Sherman Act does not
apply to unions.4 It is equally clear that if unions were within its
scope, at least some of their activities would violate the Act. Similarly,
it is conceivable that an egregious restraint of trade only affects intrastate commerce, and so is not within the scope of the Act. Alternatively,
fixing the hours when trading on an exchange may take place is within
45
46

549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977).

Id. at 890-91.

41 It is significant for another reason, too. A court with no subject matter jurisdiction may not issue a judgment with res judicata effect, whereas a 12(b)(6) dismissal has
such effect. See R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 656-59
(4th ed. 1978).
48

TIVES

See

L. SCHWARTZ

1339 (5th ed. 1977).

& J.

FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNA-
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the scope of the Act, but is not a violation.4
At this point we should again be clear that whether an activity is
within the scope of the Act, and whether it violates the Act, has nothing
to do with the jurisdiction of courts. The scope of a statute is irrelevant
to the power of a court. It is a court, after all, that must decide those
questions. The issue is not the power of a court; it is, successively: (1)
the power of Congress to make the Act apply to various activities; (2)
what in fact Congress made the Act apply to; (3) whether the defendant's conduct violates the Act, assuming it is within the scope of the
Act; and (4) can (3) be answered without a trial? This comment will
now address those questions.

II. THE
A.

SHERMAN ACT

Congressional Power

The power of Congress to enact the antitrust laws comes from
article 1, section 8 of the Constitution. There Congress is given power
to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." 50 Congress's

power under the commerce clause is very broad.
Under the general commerce clause standard set forth in cases
such as Wickard v. Filburn,51 Perez v. United States 52 and Katzenbach v. McLung,53 the power of the federal government to regulate
conduct under its commerce power extends to very remote and local
activities, which, in the aggregate, have some effect on interstate commerce. The courts have repeatedly relied on the so-called "cumulative
effect" principle of those decisions to sustain the constitutionality of
regulatory legislation."
In Wickard, for example, the Supreme Court held that Congress
could regulate a farmer's production of wheat for personal consumption
because the aggregate effect of many farmers producing for their own
consumption was felt in the interstate market for wheat. 5 "That appellee's own contribution . . . may be trivial by itself is not enough to

remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
'9 See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
51 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
52 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (loan-sharking as a class of activity was found to affect
interstate commerce so substantially as to put it within Congress's power to make individual, purely intrastate loan transactions illegal).
5- 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (relying on the cumulative effect of all restaurant sales on
interstate commerce).
" See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-5, at 236-37 (1978).
55 317 U.S. at 128.
50
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contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated,
is far from trivial."'5
B.

Scope of the Act

The development and expansion of the concept of interstate commerce as interpreted in the context of the Sherman Act has been frequently traced and is well-documented.5 7 The Supreme Court's initial
look at the interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act came
in 1895 in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.5 In that case the Court
rejected a claim under the Sherman Act against the sugar monopoly,
finding the refining of sugar to be a wholly local activity despite the
undenied allegations that the monopoly received all its raw materials
from outside the state and that the final sugar product was shipped to
every state in the union.
The restrictive E.C. Knight holding, which crippled antitrust enforcement during an extremely active decade of trust formation, 9 was
eventually confined to its facts and repudiated. The Supreme Court
later sustained claims when the alleged conspiracy directly affected distribution as well as manufacture 0 or when the alleged price fixing
agreement, though limited to operations within one state, was directed
at the interstate flow of the product. 1 The Court formulated the "flow
of commerce" test,62 under which the Sherman Act applied if the illegal
activity was directly connected to either side of a transaction in interstate commerce. In 1948 the Supreme Court substantially expanded the
scope of Sherman Act jurisdiction when it declared that a challenged
activity need not occur "in" commerce. Under the so-called "effect on
56 Id.

'7 See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 228-41 (1978); Note,
JurisdictionUnder the Sherman Act: The "Interstate Commerce" Element and the Activities of Local Real Estate Boards and Brokers, 1979 DUKE L.J. 860; Note, The
Interstate Commerce Test for Jurisdiction in Sherman Act Cases and Its Substantive
Applications, 15 GA. L. REV. 714 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Interstate
Commerce Test]; Note, Portraitof the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Portrait];Comment, The Confusing World of Interstate Commerce and Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act-A
Look at the Development and Future of the Currently Employed JurisdictionalTests,
21 VILL. L. REv. 721 (1976); Note, Recent Development: Conflicting Interpretationsof
the Sherman Act's JurisdictionalRequirement, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1215 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Recent Development].
68156 U.S. 1 (1895).
, See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
230 (1948); E. CORWIN, THE CONSTrUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 58 (14th
ed. 1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 54, § 5-4, at 234 n.9.
60 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 240-41 (1899).
"1 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-400 (1905).
62 Id. at 399.
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commerce test" laid down in Mandeville Island Farms v. American
Crystal Sugar Co.," the "exact location of [the line between interstate
and intrastate commerce makes] no difference, if the forbidden effects
flow[] across it to the injury of interstate commerce or to the hindrance
or defeat of Congressional policy regarding it."" Thus, the interstate
commerce requirement may now be fulfilled either by alleging (1) that
the violations occurred "in" interstate commerce, or (2) that they occurred in intrastate commerce, but "affect" interstate commerce in some
way.
In the past decade the Supreme Court has continued to refine the
interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act to expand the
Act's coverage.6 5 The most recent expansion occurred in McLain v.
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc." McLain involved a claim by
real estate purchasers and sellers that real estate brokers had unlawfully conspired to fix brokerage commission rates. Until McLain, the
Court's Sherman Act "affecting commerce" decisions had only considered whether defendant's alleged antitrust violations substantially affected interstate commerce. Persuasive language in McLain, however,
points toward a standard requiring only that the defendant's general
business activities, not the unlawful components of that local activity,
67
substantially affect interstate commerce:
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act
violation it would be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate
a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by re6- 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948).
6

Id. at 232.

Is See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (unanimous decision)
(finding antitrust violation in county bar association's minimum fee schedule for title
searches); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (unanimous decision) (sustaining jurisdiction over wholly intrastate conspiracy to block a hospital's expansion).
'I 444 U.S. 232 (1980) (unanimous decision).
6' For examples of cases in which McLain has been construed to mean that only
the defendant's general business activities need to substantially affect interstate commerce, see Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1983); Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir.
1980); Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1096-99
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp.,
509 F. Supp. 815, 820-21 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842,
876-77 (W.D. Pa. 1981); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F.
Supp. 1295, 1297 (N.D. Ohio 1980). See also Mann, The Applicability of Antitrust
Law to Activities of Real Estate Boards:Before and After McLain, 18 Hous. L. REV.
317, 334-35 (1981); Note, Antitrust: Application of the Sherman Act to Local Real
Estate Brokerage Activities-McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 29
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1067 (1980); Note, The Interstate Commerce Test, supra note
57, at 715.
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spondents' brokerage activity. Petitioners need not make the
more particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commission
rates, or by those other aspects of respondents' activity that

are alleged to be unlawful. 8
A number of courts have refused to interpret the McLain holding

in such an expansive way, relying on other, more conventional, language in the opinion,"' and explaining that passage in a variety of

ways.70 The Tenth Circuit in Crane v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc. ,7 for example, interpreted the McLain passage to mean that a

plaintiff need not make the particularized showing of an actual economic effect on interstate commerce, "but must make 'an allegation

showing a logical connection between the unlawful conduct and interstate commerce.'

",72

Other courts, not willing to accept the change McLain appears to
adopt, have followed the Tenth Circuit's example. One court rationalized the narrow approach by reasoning that under the broader approach a local conspiracy would be subject to federal antitrust laws on
the "fortuitous" circumstance of whether an "interstate conglomerate"
owns the defendant firm."3
The expansive interpretation of McLain is more consistent with a
444 U.s. at 242-43.
e,For example, in Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center,
536 F. Supp. 1065, after amended complaint, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the
court cited the following passage from McLain: "To establish federal jurisdiction in this
case, there remains only the requirement that respondents' activities which allegedly
have been infected by a pricefixing conspiracy be shown 'as a matter of practical economics' to have a not insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved." McLain, 444 U.S. at 246, quoted in Cardio-Medical, 536 F. Supp. at 1075 (emphasis
supplied by district court).
70 See, e.g., Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 1981); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 637
F.2d 715, 722-23 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. CrozerChester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065, 1076-78, after amended complaint, 552
F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Nara v. American Dental Ass'n, 526 F. Supp. 452,
455 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
71 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
71 Id. at 723 (citation omitted). Accord Malini v. Singleton & Assocs., 516 F.
6

Supp. 440, 442 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
78 Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 649
F.2d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 1981). Interestingly, a substantial minority of courts have either
sidestepped the issue by noting the conflict but not taking a stand, see, e.g., James R.
Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen. Contr., 677 F.2d 1111, 1115 n.3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S.Ct. 374 (1982), or merely citing McLain without noting the controversy, see,
e.g., Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982); McDonald v. Saint Joseph's
Hosp., 524 F. Supp. 122, 127 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Heille v. City of St. Paul, 512 F.
Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1981), affd, 671 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1982).
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general interpretation of the power accorded Congress by the commerce
clause of the Constitution, upon which the Sherman Act rests. 4 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the reach of the Sherman Act is coextensive with the commerce power.75 Since "[t]he reach
of the Sherman Act is 'as inclusive as the constitutional limits of Congress' power to regulate commerce,' ",76 if Congress has power pursuant
to the commerce clause to regulate or prohibit the challenged conduct,
then the Sherman Act covers such conduct." In the context of the hos-

pital staff privileges cases, that principle means that the Sherman Act
should apply if the aggregation of all hospital staff activities substantially affects interstate commerce.
Although the Supreme Court has frequently stated the principle
that the Sherman Act and commerce clause power are co-extensive, it
oddly has never relied on the "cumulative effect" of Sherman Act violations to sustain interstate commerce jurisdiction. Thus, although a
broad reading of McLain expands the scope of the Sherman Act further
than any previous case in the antitrust field, the Court has not yet been
presented with issues involving the Sherman Act at the outer reaches of
the commerce power.
Regardless of the way courts interpret McLain, it is clear that the
scope of the Sherman Act has expanded consistently since the Act's inception. The trend toward a more expansive reading of the Sherman
Act suggests that only rarely should a health care institution's contacts
with interstate commerce prove insignificant enough to place the challenged activities beyond the scope of the Act.
7'

See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2

(1976); E. CORWIN, supra note 59, at 57; L. TRIBE, supra note 54, § 5-4, at 232-36.

See generally Mann, supra note 67, at 340; Note, Antitrust: Application of the Sherman Act's JurisdictionalRequirements to the Brokerage Activities of Local Real Estate
Boards, 10 STETSON L. REV. 308, 317 (1981); 11 ENVTL. L. 161, 166 (1980) (casenote on McLain).
71 McLain, 444 U.S. at 241; Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hosp., 425
U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95
(1974); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558-59

(1944).
7'

Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir.) (quoting

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE AN-

62 (1955)), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
Commentators have noted Congress's use of broad commerce clause power in
many areas of perceived national need, such as civil rights, that are not commercial. See
Note, Portrait,supra note 57, at 323-24; Note, Recent Development, supra note 57, at
1216-17. Those noncommercial statutes have pushed the limits of constitutionally permissible legislation to include very tenuous interstate impacts. Such expansion, however, has not been limited to social welfare legislation. Federal commercial laws such as
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 have been upheld through interpreting federal
power broadly and inclusively. See Note, Portrait,supra note 57, at 325; Note, Recent
Development, supra note 57, at 1216.
TrrRusT LAWS
17

HOSPITAL STAFF EXCLUSION

III.

LOWER COURTS' CONTINUED APPLICATION OF STRICT
INTERSTATE COMMERCE REQUIREMENTS

Despite the clear trends described above, many plaintiffs in hospital staff exclusion cases still are not given the opportunity to proceed to
the merits of their cases because of summary dismissals on "jurisdictional" grounds. 78 Those "jurisdictional" hurdles frustrate the expressed liberal policy of the Supreme Court in applying the interstate
commerce requirement,79 defeat the remedial purpose of the antitrust
laws in the health care field, and retard the policy of opening that field
to the free play of market forces and the beneficial effects of free and
open competition.8 0
Many of the recent district court decisions finding no "jurisdiction" represent a grudging accommodation of the Supreme Court's recent Sherman Act precedents, discussed above.8 An excellent example
is Cardio-Medical Associates v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center,8 2 in
which several individual physicians, practicing cardiology under the
name of Cardiology Associates of Delaware County, were not allowed
to perform certain specialized cardiology procedures at a nearby hospital. After having found in "an analysis of the case law. . . no comprehensive discussion of the theories underlying any of the standards to be
applied in deciding claims of this type," ' the court discussed the "jurisdictional" issue at considerable length in two separate opinions. In the
first opinion issued in the case, the court noted the "large financial and
administrative burdens imposed on hospital defendants and the courts"
stemming from these cases. " The court intimated its "doubts that the
79 See, e.g., Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1980); Harron v. United
Hosp. Center, Inc., 522 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976);
Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir.
1975); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065,
after amended complaint, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Barr v. National Right
to Life Comm., Inc., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,315 (M. D. Fla. 1981); Moles v.
Morton F. Plant Hosp., Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,600 (M.D. Fla. 1978);
Sokol v. University Hosp., Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Mass. 1975).
Even if the dismissal is reversed, e.g., Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 689 F.2d
840 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'g 508 F. Supp. 970 (D. Or. 1981); Mishler v. St. Anthony's
Hosp. Sys., 694 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1981) (reversing unpublished district court dedsion); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981)(en
banc) (reversing unpublished district court decision), plaintiffs are unnecessarily
burdened.
79 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
10 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
11 536 F. Supp. 1065, after amended complaint, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa.

1982).
8' 552 F. Supp. at 1175.
536 F. Supp. at 1069.
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ordinary denial of staff privileges claim states a federal cause of action
in any case. "85
Plaintiffs' interstate commerce allegations in Cardio-Medical included treatment of out-of-state patients, interstate flow of revenues to
plaintiffs, use of multistate medical equipment and supplies by plaintiffs, use of out-of-state automobiles, gasoline, and other equipment by
plaintiffs, prescription by plaintiffs of drugs and medicine manufactured in other states, dissuasion of out-of-state physicians from joining
plaintiffs' staff, inflation of fees for cardiology services, diminished interstate investments in plaintiffs' pension portfolio, curtailment of
plaintiffs' practice in connection with a clinic in another state, and a
decrease in out-of-state continuing education.8" Although the reasoning
and analysis of Cardio-Medicalis the most thorough of the group of
restrictive lower court decisions, its interpretation of the "jurisdictional"
requirement seems at odds with Supreme Court precedent. Since
Cardio-Medical best illustrates the approach adopted by many district
courts, this Comment will examine its analysis of the scope of the Sherman Act.
A.

Cardio-Medical Associates v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center

Cardio-Medical lists the threshold requirements for a suit based
on violations of the Sherman Act:
plaintiffs' amended complaint must contain factual allegations that, if proved, would sustain each of three independent
underlying findings: (i) the presence of interstate commerce;
(ii) the existence of a substantial and adverse effect on inter85 Id. An interesting issue is presented by the Supreme Court's recent grant of
certiorari in a denial of hospital staff privileges case. See Hyde v. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3649
(U.S. Mar. 8, 1983) (No. 82-1031). In that case the district court did not dismiss the
claims, stating:
[T]he evidence shows that in the operation of its anesthesia department the
defendants are involved in activities which have a not insubstantial effect
on interstate commerce. These include buying anesthesia medicines and
other supplies from out of state, the receipt by patients of federal medicare
and medicaid benefits to pay for anesthesia services and the treatment of
out of state patients who require anesthesia services.
513 F. Supp. 532, 540 (E.D. La. 1981). The Fifth Circuit apparently agreed, for it
dealt only with the merits of the case, 686 F.2d at 270-72, and the issue certified by the
Supreme Court is one of substantive antitrust law. Therefore it appears that the Supreme Court, if it decides the Hyde case on the merits, will tacitly disagree with the
suggestion in Cardio-Medicalthat no individual denial of staff privilege states a federal
cause of action.
88 Cardio-Medical, 552 F. Supp. at 1187-1201.
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state commerce; and (iii) the requisite nexus between the
challenged activities of defendants and the effect on the rele87
vant channel of interstate commerce.
Moreover, the Cardio-Medicalcourt held, "the identified aspect of
interstate commerce must relate to the activities of plaintiffs, and not
defendants." 8 8 Those requirements reflect much of the general confusion in the lower courts surrounding the "effects" test.8 9
1. Substantial and Adverse Effect
Cardio-Medical requires that plaintiffs show a "substantial and
adverse" effect on their interstate commerce activities. That requirement confuses the question whether the Sherman Act is applicable
(whether the challenged activities are within the scope of the Act) with
the question whether the defendants violated the Act.
The requirement originated in the context of the merits of a Sherman Act claim. The Supreme Court said "the vital question becomes
whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse to Congress'
paramount policy declared in the Act's terms to constitute a forbidden
consequence. If so, the restraint must fall." ° Clearly, the court was
talking about the merits of the claim, not whether the Act applied.9 1
That makes sense, since the scope of the Sherman Act extends to all
activities in interstate commerce, not just those with a substantial and
adverse effect on interstate commerce. It is only those activities that
violate the Act that must have a substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce. "Adverseness" is no more than a gloss on the statutory
requirement that the challenged conduct produce a "restraint" of trade
or commerce. The "substantiality" requirement only reflects the concept that de minimis restraints of trade, under the Rule of Reason, 2 do
not violate the Act. A strict adherence to the principle that the Sherman
Act is coextensive with congressional power under the commerce
37

Id. at 1177 (emphasis in original).

SId.

6 Cardio-Medical'sdiscussion of the sufficiency of each interstate commerce allegation highlighted the unsettled nature of the law when, after rejecting many allegations, it listed at least equal numbers of cases which had held to the contrary. See 552
F. Supp. at 1188, 1191, 1193.
9o Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
234 (1948) (emphasis added).
911 The Court also seems to confuse the scope of the Act with standing requirements that plaintiffs show injury in fact. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
9' See L. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, supra note 48, at 13-14.
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clause"3 requires the elimination of any requirement of adverseness or
substantiality before application of antitrust analysis under the Act.
By confusing the scope of the Act with the substantive terms of the
Act, the Cardio-Medicalcourt denied plaintiffs the opportunity to develop their claims at trial. 4
2.

Effect on Plaintiff's Interstate Commerce Activities

The district court in Cardio-Medical concluded that plaintiffs
must demonstrate an effect on their own interstate commerce
95
activities.
The Cardio-Medical court is not alone in imposing that requirement," but more often "the case law discloses a virtual lack of discussion of this issue."91 That requirement cannot be squared with Supreme Court precedent or with the broader purposes of the Sherman
Act. The Supreme Court has never held that an effect on plaintiffs
interstate commerce must be shown to establish "jurisdiction." The
common expression is that a "not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce" must be alleged,9 8 without identifying what particular aspect of
interstate commerce must be affected.
No interpretation of the Sherman Act that requires that a particular part of interstate commerce must be affected can be consistent with
the general purpose of the antitrust laws or with the assertion that
Congress intended to use all of its power under the commerce clause in
enacting them. The antitrust laws are essentially intended to preserve
vigorous competition and are based on the conviction that the free operation of competitive markets will result in the optimal allocation of re93 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976);
Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 97
(3d ed. 1981).
552 F. Supp. at 1177.
" The district court in Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 508 F. Supp. 970, 977
15

(1981), imposed that requirement in another hospital staff privileges case, but was reversed on the issue by the Ninth Circuit. 689 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1982). Other
courts in medical cases have imposed the requirement as well. See, e.g., Pontius v.
Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1361-62 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Nara v. American
Dental Ass'n, 526 F. Supp. 452, 455 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan
Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199, 1210 (E.D. Mich. 1973). But see Konik v. Champlain
Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical Center, 561 F. Supp. 700, 710-12 (N.D.N.Y. 1983)
(explicitly rejecting Cardio-Medical test).
Cardio-Medical, 536 F. Supp. at 1076.
OS McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980).
See also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744 (1976); Burke
v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 322 (1967); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236-38 (1948).
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sources and the highest quality products and services at the lowest
prices. Section one's prohibition against concerted restraints on trade or
commerce represents a prohibition of any attempt to impair competition. The "among the several states" language merely sets the limits of
Congress's power to uphold the competitive model that lies at the core
of national economic policy. Thus, any activity that impairs the competitive economic system endorsed by Congress falls within the Sherman Act so long as an effect on any channel of interstate commerce can
be identified.9" Whether the defendant's or plaintiff's relationship to
interstate commerce feels the effect of the challenged activity should be
irrelevant, as Congress intended to protect all interstate commerce from
harmful effects.
A "jurisdictional" standard which requires an effect on the interstate commerce activities of the plaintiff seems more like the standing or
injury requirement which any private antitrust plaintiff must establish
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.10 0 A plaintiff who cannot show that
he or she has been "injured in his [or her] business or property"10 1 by
an antitrust violation may not maintain an action. It seems inappropriate, however, to transplant notions of standing into an analysis of the
scope of the Act when presumably a plaintiff must prove antitrust injury, or threat of injury, and causation at the time of trial. 0 2Moreover,
even at trial it is not required that the injury be in the "interstate commerce aspect" of the plaintiff's business.
All that the Supreme Court has required is an effect on "interstate
commerce." To require a showing relating to plaintiffs interstate commerce is to create extra obstacles for potential antitrust plaintiffs that
find no support in Supreme Court precedent and defeat the remedial
purpose of the antitrust laws in private civil cases. Furthermore, if determinations as to the scope of the Sherman Act depend on proof of
effect on plaintiff's interstate commerce, what could that requirement
possibly mean when the plaintiff is the government in a civil case? Obviously, any standard for determining whether the Sherman Act is applicable must make sense in relation to all potential plaintiffs.
3.

Illegal Activity Must Effect Interstate Commerce

The court in Cardio-Medical also adopted the more restrictive of
the two interpretations of McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Or" See Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1973).
100 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
101

Id.

202P. AREEDA,

supra note 94, at 76-77.
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leans, Inc.103: the plaintiff must allege that the required effect on interstate commerce flows not simply from defendant's general business activities, but from that portion of the defendant's conduct that plaintiff
asserts is illegal under the antitrust laws. That interpretation, although
it has been applied in cases outside the hospital area, 0 4 has been frequently utilized in hospital staff exclusion cases.1 0 5 The development of
the restrictive approach to McLain in those cases, added to the other
narrow views taken in them, reflects the consistent multiplication of
hurdles which such antitrust plaintiffs must overcome before being entitled to try the merits of their claims. That naturally gives rise to the
suspicion that the court in Cardio-Medical,and other lower courts that
have adopted similar approaches, are influenced by their views as to the
merits of the cases rather than by strictly "jurisdictional"
considerations."0 6
B.

Lower Standard in Cases Outside the Health Care Area

Lower courts have frequently dismissed hospital staff exclusion
cases for lacking the requisite impact on interstate commerce.10 7 In
Cardio-Medical,the plaintiff's allegations were spelled out in great detail, 0 8 and the fact patterns in many of the cases parallel the material
facts of Cardio-Medical.By contrast, a review of decisions dealing with
the interstate commerce connection in other cases arising under the
Sherman Act illustrates less rigorous standards. Few courts dismiss for
103 444 U.s. 232 (1980). See 552 F. Supp. at 1177.
104 See, e.g., Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank
N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981) (applied to insurance broker).
105 See, e.g., Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir.
1981) (en banc); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,173
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla.
1981); Malini v. Singleton & Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Tex. 1981). But see
Western Waste Servs. v. Universal Waste. Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.) (holding
that an assertion that defendant's general business activities affected interstate commerce was sufficient), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
106 See Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other
"Non-commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972) (arguing that courts should
take "jurisdiction" whenever "economic evils" which Sherman Act was designed to
eliminate are present); see also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 57, at 230.
107 See, e.g., Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir.
1981); Harron v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 522 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1975); Wolf v.
Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1975);
Barr v. National Right to Life Comm., Inc., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,315
(M.D. Fla. 1981); Grigg v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 1980-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,300 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Moles v. Morton F. Plant Hosp., Inc., 198081 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,600 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Capilli v. Shott, 487 F. Supp. 710
(S.D. Va. 1978), af/'d, 620 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1980); Sokol v. University Hosp., Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Mass. 1975).
'08 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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want of "jurisdiction" unless truly minimal interstate commerce allegations or possibilities exist.109 Seldom are the unsuccessful plaintiffs in
those cases able to allege an effect on more than one channel of interstate commerce. A telling comparison is provided by the decisions in
private antitrust actions against refuse collectors. Typically those are
suits by one refuse hauler against competing refuse haulers, alleging
conspiracies to monopolize, price-fixing or concerted boycotts. As in the
hospital staff exclusion cases, the defendants raise the threshold question of "subject matter jurisdiction," claiming that trash hauling is a
wholly local activity. Unlike the health care providers, however, the
trash haulers can claim few ties to interstate commerce. Nor can they
demonstrate that the federal government has already extensively exercised its powers of regulation. Plaintiffs in the trash collection cases rely
principally on the out-of-state purchase of expensive equipment and on
sporadic hauling across state lines. Typically, however, both the plaintiffs' and defendants' businesses primarily consist of local trash collection. Interestingly, courts have actually rejected plaintiffs' "jurisdictional" allegations in only two cases. 110 In the remainder of cases, the
courts have found sufficient connection to interstate commerce to apply
the antitrust laws.11
109See, e.g., Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n., 422 F.2d 836 (6th

Cir. 1970) (claim of conspiracy to monopolize rental apartments in one city available to
students); Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeyman Barbers, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962)
(claim that hotel conspired to fix minimum prices and enforce a five-day week for
hotel-based barber shop; shop alleged a large number of interstate travellers used the
barber shop); see also Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981) (claim of conspiracy by insurer to reinstitute
cancelled policies without making use of plaintiff's brokerage services; reinsurance of
"single interest" policies acquired outside Puerto Rico); Alabama Homeowners, Inc. v.
Findahome Corp., 640 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1981) (appellant had sold one home to an
out-of-state resident and alleged that local real estate association of which it was not a
member got government financing); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d
269 '(2d Cir. 1964) (claim of conspiracy by bowling alley owners to prevent plaintiff
from competing; original equipment was purchased out-of-state); John Kalin Funeral
Home, Inc. v. Fultz, 313 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (conspiracy to deny funeral
home rotation spot for unclaimed cadavers; allegation that embalming equipment came
from out-of-state).
110Heille v. City of St. Paul, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,565 (8th Cir.
1982); Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.
1969).
211 See, e.g., Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d
1094 (9th Cir. 1980); J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. William J. O'Hara, Inc., 565 F.2d
264 (3d Cir. 1977); Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse
Removal Ass'n, 242 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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CONCLUSION

There has been a tremendous amount of confusion in hospital staff
exclusion antitrust cases. First, courts have consistently and pervasively
misused the term "jurisdiction" in analyzing antitrust cases.112 While it
may not be wrong to use the term as a description of the scope of the
Sherman Act, courts must not confuse that use with the meaning of the
word in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The concepts behind
the two usages are entirely different, and the allocation of evidentiary
burden may be significantly altered by incorrect usage. No wellpleaded complaint alleging injury because of antitrust violations should
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Second, despite disclaimers by lower courts that hospital defendants enjoy no special treatment,' judicial hostility to hospital staff
exclusion plaintiffs continues. Some lower courts have invoked archaic
precedent or applied current precedent in an odd manner to summarily
dispose of such cases. As a result, those lower courts have foiled the
congressional policy of judicially enforced competition in the health care
industry.
Since the Sherman Act reaches any conduct Congress can prohibit
or regulate as part of its constitutional power to regulate interstate
commerce,1 4 cases implicating almost any facet of health services
would seem to present no interstate commerce obstacles given the wellestablished, expansive scope of that power. In view of the federal government's obvious interest in controlling escalating health care costs and
providing health care to the needy, and its already overwhelming involvement in the area," 15 the federal government unquestionably possesses ample power to regulate hospital administrative policies to insure
that they comply with national economic goals. The antitrust laws are
nothing more than another form of regulation. Furthermore, Congress
has begun to endorse competition as the favored method of controlling
health care costs." 6
Because of those trends, if a challenged practice does not constitute
a restraint of or unreasonable burden on trade, that determination
should be made and defended on the merits-not disguised in
hypertechnical summary rulings."'
See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp.
1065, after amended complaint, 552 F. Supp. 1170, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
14 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
15 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
, See supra note 4.
117 Cases that follow a more suitable approach include Konik v. Champlain Val112
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HOSPITAL STAFF EXCLUSION

The ambiguous language of the Supreme Court in McLain v.
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.18, as well as the differing
definitions of a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce, have not
ameliorated the confusion in the area. Those two ambiguities have permitted courts hostile to plaintiffs in hospital cases to increase threshold
interstate commerce requirements. A clarification of McLain by the Supreme Court endorsing the broader view of the scope of the Sherman
Act, and an approach to the substantiality requirement consistent with
other antitrust cases, would prevent courts from using unfounded "jurisdictional" concerns to dismiss cases that should be decided on their
merits.

Icy Physicians Hosp. Medical Center, 561 F. Supp. 700 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) and Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
118

444 U.S. 232 (1980).

